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ABSTRACT
We argue that the government-spending multiplier can be much larger than one when the zero lower
bound on the nominal interest rate binds. The larger is the fraction of government spending that occurs
while the nominal interest rate is zero, the larger is the value of the multiplier. After providing intuition
for these results, we investigate the size of the multiplier in a dynamic, stochastic, general equilibrium
model. In this model the multiplier effect is substantially larger than one when the zero bound binds.
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Ac l a s s i cq u e s t i o ni nm a c r o e c o n o m i c si s : w h a ti st h es i z eo ft h eg o v e r n m e n t -
spending multiplier? There is a large empirical literature that grapples with this
question. Authors such as Barro (1981) argue that the multiplier is around 0.8
while authors such as Ramey (2008) estimate the multiplier to be closer to 1.2.1
There is also a large literature that uses general-equilibrium models to study the
size of the government-spending multiplier. In standard new-Keynesian models
the government-spending multiplier can be somewhat above or below one depend-
ing on the exact speciﬁcation of agent’s preferences (see Gali, López-Salido, and
Vallés (2007) and Monacelli and Perotti (2008)). In frictionless real-business-cycle
models this multiplier is typically less than one (see e.g. Aiyagari, Christiano, and
Eichenbaum (1992), Baxter and King (1993), Burnside, Eichenbaum and Fisher
(2004), Ramey and Shapiro (1998), and Ramey (2011)). Viewed overall it is
hard to argue, based on the literature, that the government-spending multiplier
is substantially larger than one.
In this paper we argue that the government-spending multiplier can be much
larger than one when the nominal interest rate does not respond to an increase in
government spending. We develop this argument in a model where the multiplier is
quite modest if the nominal interest rate is governed by a Taylor rule. When such
ar u l ei so p e r a t i v et h en o m i n a li n t e r e s tr a t er i s e si nr e s p o n s et oa ne x p a n s i o n a r y
ﬁscal policy shock that puts upward pressure on output and inﬂation.
There is a natural scenario in which the nominal interest rate does not respond
to an increase in government spending: when the zero lower bound on the nominal
interest rate binds. We ﬁnd that the multiplier is very large in economies where
1For recent contributions to the VAR-based empirical literature on the size of the government-
spending multiplier see Fisher and Peters (2010) and Ilzetzki, Mendoza, and Vegh (2009). Hall
(2009) provides an analysis and review of the empirical literature.
1the output cost of being in the zero-bound state is also large. In such economies
it can be socially optimal to substantially raise government spending in response
to shocks that make the zero lower bound on the nominal interest rate binding.
We begin by considering an economy with Calvo-style price frictions, no cap-
ital and a monetary authority that follows a standard Taylor rule. Building on
Eggertsson and Woodford (2003) we study the eect of a temporary, unanticipated
rise in agents’ discount factor. Other things equal, the shock to the discount fac-
tor increases desired saving. Since investment is zero in this economy, aggregate
saving must be zero in equilibrium. When the shock is small enough, the real
interest rate falls and there is a modest decline in output. However, when the
shock is large enough, the zero bound becomes binding before the real interest
rate falls by enough to make aggregate saving zero. In this model, the only force
that can induce the fall in saving required to re-establish equilibrium is a large,
transitory fall in output.
Why is the fall in output so large when the economy hits the zero bound?
For a given fall in output, marginal cost falls and prices decline. With staggered
pricing, the drop in prices leads agents to expect future deﬂation. With the
nominal interest rate stuck at zero, the real interest rate rises. This perverse
rise in the real interest rate leads to an increase in desired saving which partially
undoes the eect of a given fall in output. So, the total fall in output required to
reduce desired saving to zero is very large.
This scenario resembles the paradox of thrift originally emphasized by Keynes
(1936) and recently analyzed by Krugman (1998), Eggertsson and Woodford
(2003), and Christiano (2004). In the textbook version of this paradox, prices
are constant and an increase in desired saving lowers equilibrium output. But, in
contrast to the textbook scenario, the zero-bound scenario studied in the modern
literature involves a deﬂationary spiral which contributes to and accompanies the
2large fall in output.
Consider now the eect of an increase in government spending when the zero
bound is strictly binding. This increase leads to a rise in output, marginal cost
and expected inﬂation. With the nominal interest rate stuck at zero, the rise
in expected inﬂation drives down the real interest rate, which drives up private
spending. This rise in spending leads to a further rise in output, marginal cost, and
expected inﬂation and a further decline in the real interest rate. The net result is a
large rise in output and a large fall in the rate of deﬂation. In eect, the increase
in government consumption counteracts the deﬂationary spiral associated with
the zero-bound state.
The exact value of the government-spending multiplier depends on a variety
of factors. However, we show that this multiplier is large in economies in which
the output cost associated with the zero-bound problem is more severe. We argue
this point in two ways. First, we show that the value of the government-spending
multiplier can depend sensitively on the model’s parameter values. But, parameter
values which are associated with large declines in output when the zero bound
binds are also associated with large values of the government-spending multiplier.
Second, we show that the value of the government-spending multiplier is positively
related to how long the zero bound is expected to bind.
An important practical objection to using ﬁscal policy to counteract a contrac-
tion associated with the zero-bound state is that there are long lags in implement-
ing increases in government spending. Motivated by this consideration, we study
the size of the government-spending multiplier in the presence of implementation
lags. We ﬁnd that a key determinant of the size of the multiplier is the state of
the world in which new government spending comes on line. If it comes on line in
future periods when the nominal interest rate is zero then there is a large eect
on current output. If it comes on line in future periods where the nominal interest
3rate is positive, then the current eect on government spending is smaller. So
our analysis supports the view that, for ﬁscal policy to be eective, government
spending must come online in a timely manner.
In the second step of our analysis we incorporate capital accumulation into
the model. For computational reasons we consider temporary shocks that make
the zero bound binding for a deterministic number of periods. Again, we ﬁnd
that the government-spending multiplier is larger when the zero bound binds.
Allowing for capital accumulation has two eects. First, for a given size shock it
reduces the likelihood that the zero bound becomes binding. Second, when the
zero bound binds, the presence of capital accumulation tends to increase the size
of the government-spending multiplier. The intuition for this result is that, in our
model, investment is a decreasing function of the real interest rate. When the
zero bound binds, the real interest rate generally rises. So, other things equal,
saving and investment diverge as the real interest rate rises, thus exacerbating the
meltdown associated with the zero bound. As a result, the fall in output necessary
to bring saving and investment into alignment is larger than in the model without
capital.
The simple models discussed above suggest that the multiplier can be large in
the zero-bound state. The obvious next step would be to use reduced form meth-
ods, such as identiﬁed VARs, to estimate the government-spending multiplier
when the zero bound binds. Unfortunately, this task is fraught with diculties.
First, we cannot mix evidence from states where the zero bound binds with evi-
dence from other states because the multipliers are very dierent in the two states.
Second, we have to identify exogenous movements in government spending when
the zero bound binds.2 This task seems daunting at best. Almost surely gov-
2To see how critical this step is, suppose that the government chooses spending to keep
output exactly constant in the face of shocks that make the zero bound bind. A naive econo-
metrician who simply regressed output on government spending would falsely conclude that the
4ernment spending would rise in response to large output losses in the zero-bound
state. To know the government spending multiplier we need to know what output
would have been had government spending not risen. For example, the simple
observation that output did not grow quickly in Japan in the zero-bound state,
even though there were large increases in government spending, tells us nothing
about the question of interest.
Given these diculties, we investigate the size of the multiplier in the zero-
bound state using the empirically plausible DSGE model proposed by Altig, Chris-
tiano, Eichenbaum and Lindé (2011) (henceforth ACEL). This model incorporates
price and wage setting frictions, habit formation in consumption, variable capital
utilization and investment adjustment costs of the sort proposed by Christiano,
Eichenbaum and Evans (2005) (henceforth CEE). ACEL estimate the parameters
of their model to match the impulse response function of ten macro variables to a
monetary shock, a neutral technology shock, and a capital-embodied technology
shock.
Our key ﬁndings based on the ACEL model can be summarized as follows.
First, when the central bank follows a Taylor rule, the value of the government-
spending multiplier is generally less than one. Second, the multiplier is much larger
if the nominal interest rate does not respond to the rise in government spending.
For example, suppose that government spending goes up for 12 quarters and the
nominal interest rate remains constant. In this case the impact multiplier is
roughly 1.6 and has a peak value of about 2.3.T h i r d , t h e v a l u e o f t h e m u l t i -
plier depends critically on how much government spending occurs in the period
during which the nominal interest rate is constant. The larger is the fraction of
government spending that occurs while the nominal interest rate is constant, the
government spending multiplier is zero. This example is, of course, just an application of Tobin’s
(1970) post hoc ergo propter hoc argument.
5smaller is the value of the multiplier. Consistent with the theoretical analysis
above, this result implies that for government spending to be a powerful weapon
in combating output losses associated with the zero-bound state, it is critical that
the bulk of the spending come on line when the lower bound is actually binding.
Fourth, we ﬁnd that the model generates sensible predictions for the current crisis
under the assumption that the zero bound binds. In particular the model does
well at accounting for the behavior of output, consumption, investment, inﬂation,
and short-term nominal interest rates.
As emphasized by Eggertsson and Woodford (2003), an alternative way to
escape the negative consequences of a shock that makes the zero bound binding
is for the central bank to commit to future inﬂation. We abstract from this
possibility in this paper. We do so for a number of reasons. First, this theoretical
possibility is well understood. Second, we do not think that it is easy in practice
for the central bank to credibly commit to future high inﬂation. Third, the optimal
trade-o between higher government purchases and anticipated inﬂation depends
sensitively on how agents value government purchases and the costs of anticipated
inﬂation. Studying this issue is an important topic for future research.
Our analysis builds on Christiano (2004) and Eggertsson (2004) who argue
that increasing government spending is very eective when the zero bound binds.
Eggertsson (2011) analyzes both the eects of increases in government spending
and transitory tax cuts when the zero bound binds. The key contributions of this
paper are to analyze the size of the multiplier in a medium-size DSGE model,
study the model’s performance in the ﬁnancial crisis that began in 2008, and
quantify the importance of the timing of government spending relative to the
timing of the zero bound.
Our analysis is related to several recent papers on the zero bound. Bodenstein,
Erceg, and Guerrieri (2009) analyze the eects of shocks to open economies when
6the zero bound binds. Braun and Waki (2006) use a model in which the zero
bound binds to account for Japan’s experience in the 1990s. Their results for
ﬁscal policy are broadly consistent with our results. Braun and Waki (2006) and
Coenen and Wieland (2003) investigate whether alternative monetary policy rules
could have avoided the zero bound state in Japan.
Our paper is organized as follows. In section 2 we analyze the size of the
government-spending multiplier when the interest follows a Taylor rule in a stan-
dard new-Keynesian model without capital. In section 3 we modify the analysis to
assume that the nominal interest rate does not respond to an increase in govern-
ment spending, say because the lower bound on the nominal interest rate binds.
In section 4 we extend the model to incorporate capital. In section 5 we discuss
the properties of the government-spending multiplier in the medium size DSGE
model proposed by ACEL and investigate the performance of the model during
the recent ﬁnancial crisis. Section 6 investigates the sensitivity of our conclusions
to the presence of distortionary taxes. Section 7 concludes.
2. The standard multiplier in a model without capital
In this section we present a simple new-Keynesian model and analyze its implica-
tions for the size of the “standard multiplier,” by which we mean the size of the
government-spending multiplier when the nominal interest rate is governed by a
Taylor rule.
Households The economy is populated by a representative household, whose














.( 2 . 1 )
7Here E0 is the conditional expectation operator, and Ct, Gt,a n dNt denote time-
t consumption, government consumption, and hours worked, respectively. We
assume that >0,   (0,1),a n dt h a tv(.) is a concave function.
The household budget constraint is given by:
PtCt + Bt+1 = Bt (1 + Rt)+WtNt + Tt,( 2 . 2 )
where Tt denotes ﬁrms’ proﬁts net of lump-sum taxes paid to the government.
The variable Bt+1 denotes the quantity of one-period bonds purchased by the
household at time t.A l s o ,Pt denotes the price level and Wt denotes the nominal
wage rate. Finally, Rt denotes the one-period nominal rate of interest that pays
o in period t. The household’s problem is to maximize utility given by equation
(2.1) subject to the budget constraint given by equation (2.2) and the condition
E0 limt Bt+1/[(1 + R0)(1 + R1)...(1 + Rt)]  0.









,> 1,( 2 . 3 )
where Yt (i),i [0,1] denotes intermediate good i.







,( 2 . 4 )
where Pt(i) denotes the price of intermediate good i and Pt is the price of the
homogeneous ﬁnal good.
The intermediate good, Yt (i),i sp r o d u c e db yam o n o p o l i s tu s i n gt h ef o l l o w i n g
technology:
Yt (i)=Nt (i),
8where Nt (i) denotes employment by the ith monopolist. We assume there is no
entry or exit into the production of the ith intermediate good. The monopolist
is subject to Calvo-style price-setting frictions and can optimize its price, Pt (i),
with probability 1  .W i t hp r o b a b i l i t y the ﬁrm sets:
Pt (i)=Pt1 (i).





jt+j [Pt+j (i)Yt+j (i)  (1  )Wt+jNt+j (i)],( 2 . 5 )
where  =1 / denotes an employment subsidy which corrects, in steady state, the
ineciency created by the presence of monopoly power. The variable t+j is the
multiplier on the household budget constraint in the Lagrangian representation of
the household problem. The variable Wt+j denotes the nominal wage rate.
Firm i maximizes its discounted proﬁts, given by equation (2.5), subject to the
Calvo price-setting friction, the production function, and the demand function for
Yt (i),g i v e nb ye q u a t i o n( 2 . 4 ) .
Monetary policy We assume that monetary policy follows the rule:
Rt+1 = max(Zt+1,0),( 2 . 6 )
where
Zt+1 =( 1 /)(1 + t)
1(1R)(Yt/Y)
2(1R) [ (1 + Rt)]
R  1.
Throughout the paper a variable without a time subscript denotes its steady state
value, e.g. the variable Y denotes the steady-state level of output. The variable
t denotes the time-t rate of inﬂation. We assume that 1 > 1 and 2  (0,1).
9According to equation (2.6) the monetary authority follows a Taylor rule as
long as the implied nominal interest rate is non-negative. Whenever the Taylor
rule implies a negative nominal interest rate, the monetary authority simply sets
the nominal interest rate to zero. For convenience we assume that steady-state in-
ﬂation is zero. This assumption implies that the steady-state net nominal interest
rate is 1/  1.
Fiscal policy As long as the zero bound on the nominal interest rate is not
binding, government spending evolves according to:
Gt+1 = G

t exp(t+1).( 2 . 7 )
Here G is the level of government spending in the non-stochastic steady state and
t+1 is an i.i.d. shock with zero mean. To simplify our analysis, we assume that
government spending and the employment subsidy are ﬁnanced with lump-sum
taxes. The exact timing of these taxes is irrelevant because Ricardian equivalence
holds under our assumptions. We discuss the details of ﬁscal policy when the zero
bound binds in Section 3.
Equilibrium The economy’s resource constraint is:
Ct + Gt = Yt.( 2 . 8 )
A‘ m o n e t a r ye q u i l i b r i u m ’i sac o l l e c t i o no fs t o c h a s t i cp r o c e s s e s ,
{Ct,N t,W t,P t,Y t,R t,P t (i),Y t (i),N t (i),t,B t+1,t},
such that for given {Gt} the household and ﬁrm problems are satisﬁed, the mone-
tary and ﬁscal policy rules are satisﬁed, markets clear, and the aggregate resource
constraint is satisﬁed.
10To solve for the equilibrium we use a linear approximation around the non-
stochastic steady state of the economy. Throughout, ˆ Zt denotes the percentage
deviation of Zt from its non-stochastic steady state value, Z.T h ee q u i l i b r i u mi s
characterized by the following set of equations.
The Phillips curve for this economy is given by:
t = Et

t+1 +  MCt

,( 2 . 9 )
where  =( 1 )(1 )/.I na d d i t i o n ,MCt denotes real marginal cost which,
under our assumptions, is equal to the real wage rate. Absent labor market
frictions, the percent deviation of real marginal cost from its steady state value is
given by:
 MCt = ˆ Ct +
N
1  N
ˆ Nt.( 2 . 1 0 )
The linearized intertemporal Euler equation for consumption is:











The linearized aggregate resource constraint is:
ˆ Yt =( 1 g) ˆ Ct + g ˆ Gt,( 2 . 1 2 )
where g = G/Y .
Combining equations (2.9) and (2.10) and using the fact that ˆ Nt = ˆ Yt we
obtain:













.( 2 . 1 3 )
11Similarly, combining equations (2.11) and (2.12) and using the fact that ˆ Nt = ˆ Yt
we obtain:
ˆ Yt  g [ (  1) + 1] ˆ Gt = (2.14)
Et

(1  g)[ (Rt+1  R)  t+1]+ˆ Yt+1  g [ (  1) + 1] ˆ Gt+1

.
As long as the zero bound on the nominal interest rate does not bind, the
linearized monetary policy rule is given by:




1t + 2ˆ Yt

.
Whenever the zero bound binds, Rt+1 =0 .
We solve for the equilibrium using the method of undetermined coecients.
For simplicity, we begin by considering the case in which R =0 .U n d e r t h e
assumption that 1 > 1,t h e r ei sau n i q u el i n e a re q u i l i b r i u mi nw h i c ht and ˆ Yt
are given by:
t = A ˆ Gt,( 2 . 1 5 )
ˆ Yt = AY ˆ Gt.( 2 . 1 6 )















,( 2 . 1 7 )
AY = g
(  1)  [ (  1) + 1](1  )(1 )





.( 2 . 1 8 )
The eect of an increase in government spending Using equation (2.12)













.( 2 . 1 9 )
12This equation implies that the multiplier is less than one whenever consumption
falls in response to an increase in government spending. Equation (2.16) implies






.( 2 . 2 0 )
To analyze the magnitude of the multiplier outside of the zero bound we con-
sider the following baseline parameter values:
 =0 .85,=0 .99, 1 =1 .5, 2 =0 ,=0 .29, g =0 .2,  =2 , R =0 ,  =0 .8.
(2.21)
These parameter values imply that  =0 .03 and N =1 /3.O u rb a s e l i n ep a r a m e t e r
values imply that the government-spending multiplier is 1.05.
In our model Ricardian equivalence holds. From the perspective of the repre-
sentative household, the increase in the present value of taxes equals the increase
in the present value of government purchases. In a typical version of the standard
neoclassical model we would expect some rise in output driven by the negative
wealth eect on leisure of the tax increase. But in that model the multiplier is
generally less than one because the wealth eect reduces private consumption.
From this perspective it is perhaps surprising that the multiplier in our base-
line model is greater than one. This perspective neglects two key features of
our model: the frictions in price setting and the complementarity between con-
sumption and leisure in preferences. When government purchases increase, total
demand, Ct + Gt,i n c r e a s e s .S i n c ep r i c e sa r es t i c k y ,p r i c eo v e rm a r g i n a lc o s tf a l l s
after a rise in demand. As emphasized in the literature on the role of monopoly
power in business cycles, the fall in the markup induces an outward shift in the
labor demand curve. This shift ampliﬁes the rise in employment following the
rise in demand. Given our speciﬁcation of preferences, >1 implies that the
marginal utility of consumption rises with the increase in employment. As long as
13this increase in marginal utility is large enough, it is possible for private consump-
tion to actually rise in response to an increase in government purchases. Indeed,
consumption does rise in our benchmark scenario which is why the multiplier is
larger than one.
To assess the importance of our preference speciﬁcation we redid our calcula-
tions using the basic speciﬁcation for the momentary utility function commonly







/(1  )  N
1+
t /(1 + ),( 2 . 2 2 )
where, , ,a n d are positive. The key feature of this speciﬁcation is that the
marginal utility of consumption is independent of hours worked. Consistent with
the intuition discussed above, we found that, across a wide set of parameter values,
dY/dG is always less than one with this preference speciﬁcation.3
To provide additional intuition for the determinants of the multiplier, we cal-
culate dY/dG for various parameter conﬁgurations. In each case we perturb one
parameter at a time relative to the benchmark parameter values. Our results
can be summarized as follows. First, we ﬁnd that the multiplier is an increasing
function of .T h i sr e s u l ti sc o n s i s t e n tw i t ht h ei n t u i t i o na b o v ew h i c hb u i l d so n
the observation that the marginal utility of consumption is increasing in hours
worked. This dependence is stronger the higher is .
Second, the multiplier is a decreasing function of .I no t h e rw o r d s ,t h em u l -
tiplier is larger the higher is the degree of price stickiness. This result reﬂects the
fall in the markup when aggregate demand and marginal cost rise. This eect is
stronger the stickier are prices. The multiplier exceeds one for all <0.13.I n
the limiting case when prices are perfectly sticky ( =0 )t h em u l t i p l i e ri sg i v e n
3See Monacelli and Perotti (2008) for a discussion of the impact of preferences on the size of






[ (  1) + 1](1  )
1   +( 1 g)2
> 0.
Note that when 2 =0the multiplier is greater than one as long as  is greater
than one.
When prices are perfectly ﬂexible ( = )t h em a r k u pi sc o n s t a n t . I nt h i s





1+( 1 g) N
1N
< 1.
This result reﬂects the fact that with ﬂexible prices an increase in government
spending has no impact on the markup. As a result, the demand for labor does
not rise as much as in the case in which prices are sticky.
Third, the multiplier is a decreasing function of 1.T h ei n t u i t i o nf o rt h i se  e c t
is that the expansion in output increases marginal cost which in turn induces a
rise in inﬂation. According to equation (2.6) the monetary authority increases
the interest rate in response to a rise in inﬂation. The rise in the interest rate is
an increasing function of 1.H i g h e rv a l u e so f1 lead to higher values of the real
interest rate which are associated with lower levels of consumption. So, higher
values of 1 lead to lower values of the multiplier.
Fourth, the multiplier is a decreasing function of 2.T h ei n t u i t i o nu n d e r l y i n g
this eect is similar to that associated with 1.W h e n 2 is large there is a
substantial increase in the real interest rate in response to a rise in output. The
contractionary eects of the rise in the real interest rate on consumption reduce
the size of the multiplier.
Fifth, the multiplier is an increasing function of R.T h e i n t u i t i o n f o r t h i s
result is as follows. The higher is R the less rapidly the monetary authority
increases the interest rate in response to the rise in marginal cost and inﬂation
that occur in the wake of an increase in government purchases. This result is
15consistent with the traditional view that the government-spending multiplier is
greater in the presence of accommodative monetary policy. By accommodative
we mean that the monetary authority raises interest rates slowly in the presence
of a ﬁscal expansion.
Sixth, the multiplier is a decreasing function of the parameter governing the
persistence of government purchases, .T h e i n t u i t i o n f o r t h i s r e s u l t i s t h a t t h e
present value of taxes associated with a given innovation in government purchases
is an increasing function of .S ot h en e g a t i v ew e a l t he  e c to nc o n s u m p t i o ni sa n
increasing function of .4
Our numerical results suggest that the multiplier in a simple new-Keynesian
model can be above one for reasonable parameter values. However, it is dicult
to obtain multipliers above 1.2 for plausible parameter values.
3. The constant-interest-rate multiplier in a model without
capital
In this section we analyze the government-spending multiplier in our simple new-
Keynesian model when the nominal interest rate is constant. We focus on the
case in which the nominal interest rate is constant because the zero bound binds.
Our basic analysis of the multiplier builds on the work of Christiano (2004) and
Eggertsson (2004) and Eggertsson and Woodford (2003). As in these papers the
shock that makes the zero bound binding is an increase in the discount factor. We
think of this shock as representing a temporary rise in agents’ propensity to save.
4We redid our calculations using a forward-looking Taylor rule in which the interest rate re-
sponds to the one-period-ahead expected inﬂation and output gap. The results that we obtained
are very similar to the ones discussed in the main text.
16Ad i s c o u n tf a c t o rs h o c k We modify agent’s preferences, given by (2.1), to
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1 t =0 .
(3.2)
The time-t discount factor, rt,c a nt a k eo nt w ov a l u e s :r and rl,w h e r erl < 0.

















The value of rt+1 is realized at time t.W e d e ﬁ n e  =1 /(1 + r),w h e r er is the
steady state value of rt+1.
We consider the following experiment. The economy is initially in the steady
state, so rt = r.A t t i m e z e r o r1 takes on the value rl.T h e r e a f t e r rt follows
the process described by equation (3.3). The discount factor remains high with
probability p and returns permanently to its normal value, r,w i t hp r o b a b i l i t y
1  p.I nw h a tf o l l o w sw ea s s u m et h a trl is suciently high that the zero-bound
constraint on nominal interest rates binds. We assume that ˆ Gt = ˆ Gl  0 in the
lower bound and ˆ Gt =0otherwise.
To solve the model we suppose (and then verify) that the equilibrium is char-
acterized by two values for each variable: one value for when the zero bound binds
and one value for when it is not. We denote the values of inﬂation and output in
the zero bound by l and ˆ Y l,r e s p e c t i v e l y .F o rs i m p l i c i t yw ea s s u m et h a tR =0 ,
so there is no interest rate smoothing in the Taylor rule, (2.6). Since there are no
state variables and ˆ Gt =0outside of the zero bound state, as soon as the zero
bound is not binding the economy jumps to the steady state.
17We can solve for ˆ Y l using equation (2.13) and the following version of equation
(2.14), which takes into account the discount factor shock:
ˆ Yt  g [(  1) + 1] ˆ Gt (3.4)
= Et

ˆ Yt+1  g [(  1) + 1] ˆ Gt+1  (1  g)(Rt+1  rt+1)+( 1 g)t+1

We focus on the case in which the zero bound binds at time t,s oRt+1 =0 .
Equations (2.13) and (3.4) can be re-written as:
ˆ Y
























l.( 3 . 6 )





















l.( 3 . 7 )
ˆ Y
l =
(1  p)(1 g)rl

+
(1  p)(1 p)[ (  1) + 1]  p

g ˆ G
l,( 3 . 8 )
where:








Since rl is negative, a necessary condition for the zero bound to bind is that
 > 0.I ft h i sc o n d i t i o nd i dn o th o l di n ﬂ a t i o nw o u l db ep o s i t i v ea n do u t p u tw o u l d
be above its steady state value. Consequently, the Taylor rule would call for an
increase in the nominal interest rate so that the zero bound would not bind.
Equation (3.8) implies that the drop in output induced by a change in the
discount rate, which we denote by ,i sg i v e nb y :
=
(1  p)(1 g)rl

.( 3 . 9 )
18By assumption  > 0,s o < 0.T h ev a l u eo f can be a large negative number
for plausible parameter values. The intuition for this result is as follows. The
basic shock to the economy is an increase in agent’s desire to save. We develop
the intuition for this result in two steps. First, we provide intuition for why the
zero bound binds. We then provide the intuition for why the drop in output can
to be very large when the zero bound binds.
To understand why the zero bound binds, recall that in this economy saving
must be zero in equilibrium. With completely ﬂexible prices the real interest rate
would simply fall to discourage agents from saving. There are two ways in which
such a fall can occur: a large fall in the nominal interest rate and/or a substantial
rise in the expected inﬂation rate. The extent to which the nominal interest rate
can fall is limited by the zero bound. In our sticky-price economy a rise in the rate
of inﬂation is associated with a rise in output and marginal cost. But a transitory
increase in output is associated with a further increase in the desire to save, so
that the real interest rate must rise by even more. Given the size of the shock
to the discount factor, there may be no equilibrium in which the nominal interest
rate is zero and inﬂation is positive. So the real interest rate cannot fall by enough
to reduce desired saving to zero. In this scenario the zero bound binds.
Figure 1 illustrates this point using a stylized version of our model. Saving
(S)i sa ni n c r e a s i n gf u n c t i o no ft h er e a li n t e r e s tr a t e .S i n c et h e r ei sn oi n v e s t m e n t
in this economy saving must be zero in equilibrium. The initial equilibrium is
represented by point A.B u tt h ei n c r e a s ei nt h ed i s c o u n tf a c t o rc a nb et h o u g h to f
as inducing a rightward shift in the saving curve from S to S.W h e nt h i ss h i f ti s
large, the real interest rate cannot fall enough to re-establish equilibrium because
the lower bound on the nominal interest rate becomes binding prior to reaching
that point. This situation is represented by point B.
To understand why the fall in output can be very large when the zero bound
19binds, recall that equation (3.7) shows how the rate of inﬂation, l,d e p e n d so n
the discount rate and on government spending in the zero bound state. In this
state  is positive. Since rl is negative, it follows that l is negative and so too
is expected inﬂation, pl.S i n c e t h e n o m i n a l i n t e r e s t r a t e i s z e r o a n d e x p e c t e d
inﬂation is negative, the real interest rate (nominal interest rate minus expected
inﬂation rate) is positive. Both the increase in the discount factor and the rise
in the real interest rate increase agent’s desire to save. There is only one force
remaining to generate zero saving in equilibrium: a large, transitory fall in income.
Other things equal this fall in income reduces desired saving as agents attempt
to smooth the marginal utility of consumption over states of the world. Because
the zero bound is a transitory state of the world this force leads to a decrease
in agents desire to save. This eect has to exactly counterbalance the other two
forces which are leading agents to save more. This reasoning suggest that there
is a very large decline in income when the zero bound binds. In terms of Figure
1w ec a nt h i n ko ft h et e m p o r a r yf a l li no u t p u ta si n d u c i n gas h i f ti nt h es a v i n g
curve to the left.
We now turn to a numerical analysis of the government-spending multiplier,
which is given by:
dY l
dGl =
(1  p)(1 p)[ (  1) + 1]  p

.( 3 . 1 0 )
In what follows we assume that the discount factor shock is suciently large to
make the zero bound binding. Conditional on this bound being binding, the size
of the multiplier does not depend on the size of the shock. In our discussion of
the standard multiplier we assume that the ﬁrst-order serial correlation of govern-
ment spending shocks is 0.8.T om a k et h ee x p e r i m e n ti nt h i ss e c t i o nc o m p a r a b l e
we choose p =0 .8.T h i s c h o i c e i m p l i e s t h a t t h e ﬁ r s t - o r d e r s e r i a l c o r r e l a t i o n o f
government spending in the zero bound is also 0.8.A l l o t h e r p a r a m e t e r v a l u e s
20are given by the baseline speciﬁcation in (2.21).
For our benchmark speciﬁcation the government-spending multiplier is 3.7,
which is roughly three times larger than the standard multiplier. The intuition
for why the multiplier can be large when the nominal interest rate is constant, say
because the zero bound binds, is as follows. A rise in government spending leads to
ar i s ei no u t p u t ,m a r g i n a lc o s ta n de x p e c t e di n ﬂ a t i o n .W i t ht h en o m i n a li n t e r e s t
rate equal to zero, the rise in expected inﬂation drives down the real interest rate,
leading to a rise is private spending. This rise in spending generates a further rise
in output, marginal cost, and expected inﬂation and a further decline in the real
interest rate. The net result is a large rise in inﬂation and output.
The increase in income in states where the zero bound binds raises permanent
income, which raises desired expenditures in zero bound states. This additional
channel reinforces the intertemporal channel stressed above. Since the zero-bound
problem is temporary, we expect that the importance of this channel is relatively
small.
We now consider the sensitivity of the multiplier to parameter values. The
ﬁrst row of Figure 2 displays the government-spending multiplier and the response
of output to the discount rate shock in the absence of a change in government
spending as a function of the parameter .T h e ‘ ’i n d i c a t e sr e s u l t sf o ro u r
benchmark value of .T h i s r o w i s g e n e r a t e d a s s u m i n g a d i s c o u n t f a c t o r s h o c k
such that rl is equal to 2 percent on an annualized basis. We graph only values
of  for which the zero bound binds, so we display results for 0.02    0.036.
Three key features of this ﬁgure are worth noting. First, the multiplier can be
very large. Second, absent a change in government spending, the decline in output
is increasing in the degree of price ﬂexibility, i.e. it is increasing in ,a sl o n ga s
the zero bound binds. This result reﬂects that, conditional on the zero bound
binding, the more ﬂexible are prices, the higher is expected deﬂation and the
21higher is the real interest rate. So, other things equal, higher values of  require
al a r g et r a n s i t o r yf a l li no u t p u tt oe q u a t es a v i n ga n di n v e s t m e n tw h e nt h ez e r o
bound binds.5 Third, the government-spending multiplier is also an increasing
function of .
The second row of Figure 2 displays the government-spending multiplier and
the response of output to the discount rate shock in the absence of a change in
government spending as a function of the parameter p.T h e‘ ’i n d i c a t e sr e s u l t s
for our benchmark value of p.W eg r a p ho n l yv a l u e so fp for which the zero bound
binds, so we display results for 0.75  p  0.82.T w o k e y r e s u l t s a r e w o r t h
noting. First, absent a change in government spending the decline in output is
increasing in p.S ot h el o n g e ri st h ee x p e c t e dd u r a t i o no ft h es h o c kt h ew o r s ea r e
the output consequences of the zero bound being binding. Second, the value of
the government-spending multiplier is an increasing function of p.
Figure 2 shows that the precise value of the multiplier is sensitive to the
choice of parameter values. But looking across parameter values we see that
the government-spending multiplier is large in economies where the drop in out-
put associated with the zero bound is also large. Put dierently, ﬁscal policy is
particularly powerful in economies where the zero-bound state entails large output
losses. One more way to see this result is to analyze the impact of changes in N,
which governs the elasticity of labor supply, on dY l/dGl and .E q u a t i o n s( 3 . 1 0 )
and (3.9) imply that:
dY l
dGl =
(1  p)(1 p)[ (  1) + 1]  p
(1  p)(1 g)rl .( 3 . 1 1 )
From equation (3.9) we see that changes in N that make  converge to zero imply
that ,t h ei m p a c to fd i s c o u n tf a c t o rs h o c ko no u t p u t ,c o n v e r g e st om i n u si n ﬁ n i t y .
5The basic logic here is consistent with the intuition in De Long and Summers (1986) about
the potentially destabilizing eects of marginal increases in price ﬂexibility.
22It follows directly from equation (3.11) that the same changes in N cause dY l/dGl
to go to inﬁnity. So, again we conclude that the government-spending multiplier is
particularly large in economies where the output costs of being in the zero-bound
state are very large.6
Sensitivity to the timing of government spending In practice there is
likely be a lag between the time at which the zero bound becomes binding and
the time at which additional government purchases begin. A natural question is:
how does the economy respond at time t to the knowledge that the government
will increase spending in the future? Consider the following scenario. At time t
the zero bound binds. Government spending does not change at time t,b u ti t
takes on the value Gl >Gfrom time t +1on, as long as the economy is in the











ˆ Yt,( 3 . 1 2 )
ˆ Yt =( 1 g)r
l + pˆ Y
l  g [ (  1) + 1]p ˆ G
l +( 1 g)p
l.( 3 . 1 3 )
Here we use the fact that ˆ Gt =0 , Et (t+1)=pl, Et( ˆ Gt+1)=p ˆ Gl,a n dEt(ˆ Yt+1)=
pˆ Y l.T h ev a l u e so fl and ˆ Y l are given by equations (3.7) and (3.8), respectively.








d ˆ Gl.( 3 . 1 4 )
Here the subscript 1 denotes the presence of a one period delay in implementing an
increase in government spending. So, dYt,1/dGl represents the impact on output
at time t of an increase in government spending at time t +1 .O n e c a n s h o w
that the multiplier is increasing in the probability, p,t h a tt h ee c o n o m yr e m a i n si n
6An exception pertains to the parameter . The value of dY l/dGl is monotonically increasing
in ,b u tdˆ Y l/drl is independent of .
23the zero bound. The multiplier operates through the eect of a future increase in
government spending on expected inﬂation. If the economy is in the zero bound
in the future, an increase in government purchases increases future output and
therefore future inﬂation. From the perspective of time t,t h i se  e c tl e a d st o
higher expected inﬂation and a lower real interest rate. This lower real interest
rate reduces desired saving and increases consumption and output at time t.
Evaluating equation (3.14) at the benchmark values we obtain a multiplier
equal to 1.5.W h i l et h i sm u l t i p l i e ri sm u c hl o w e rt h a nt h eb e n c h m a r km u l t i p l i e r
of 3.7,i ti ss t i l ll a r g e .M o r e o v e r ,t h i sm u l t i p l i e rp e r t a i n st oa ni n c r e a s ei nt o d a y ’ s
output in response to an increase in future government spending that only occurs
if the economy is in the zero-bound state in the future.
Suppose that it takes two periods for government purchases to increase in the
event that the zero bound binds. It is straightforward to show that the impact
on current output of a potential increase in government spending that takes two














Here the subscript 2 denotes the presence of a two period delay. Using our bench-
mark parameters the value of this multiplier is 1.44,s ot h er a t ea tw h i c ht h e
multiplier declines as we increase the implementation lag is relatively low.
Consider now the case in which the increase in government spending occurs
only after the zero bound ends. Suppose, for example, that at time t the govern-
ment promises to implement a persistent increase in government spending at time
t+1,i ft h ee c o n o m ye m e r g e sf r o mt h ez e r ob o u n da tt i m et+1.T h i si n c r e a s ei n
government purchases is governed by: ˆ Gt+j =0 .8j1 ˆ Gt+1,f o rj  2.I nt h i sc a s e
the value of the multiplier, dYt/dGt+1,i so n l y0.46 for our benchmark values.
The usual objection to using ﬁscal policy as a tool for ﬁghting recessions is
24that there are long lags in gearing up increases in spending. Our analysis indicates
that the key question is: in which state of the world does additional government
spending come on line? If it comes on line in future periods when the zero bound
binds there is a large eect on current output. If it comes on line in future periods
where the zero bound is not binding the current eect on government spending is
smaller.
Optimal government spending The fact that the government-spending mul-
tiplier is so large in the zero bound raises the following question: taking as given
the monetary policy rule described by equation (2.6) what is the optimal level
of government spending when the representative agent’s discount rate is higher
than its steady state level? In what follows we use the superscript L to denote
the value of variables in states of the world where the discount rate is rl.I nt h e s e
states of the world the zero bound may or may not be binding, depending on the
level of government spending. From equation (3.7) we anticipate that the higher
is government spending, the higher is expected inﬂation, and the less likely the
zero bound is to bind.
We choose GL to maximize the expected utility of the consumer in states of
the world in which the discount factor is high and the zero bound binds. For





























































































We choose the value of ˆ GL that maximizes UL subject to the intertemporal
Euler equation (equation (2.14)), the Phillips curve (equation (2.13)), and ˆ Yt =























The last constraint takes into account that the zero bound on interest rates may
not be binding even though the discount rate is high.





We choose g so that g = G/Y is equal to 0.2.
Since government purchases are ﬁnanced with lump sum taxes, the optimal











Using our benchmark parameter values we obtain a value of g equal to 0.015.
Figure 3 displays the values of UL, ˆ Y L, ZL, ˆ CL, RL,a n dL as a function
of ˆ GL.T h e ‘ * ’ i n d i c a t e s t h e l e v e l o f a v a r i a b l e c o r r e s p o n d i n g t o t h e o p t i m a l
value of ˆ GL.T h e‘ o ’i n d i c a t e st h el e v e lo fav a r i a b l ec o r r e s p o n d i n gt ot h eh i g h e s t
value of ˆ GL that satisﬁes Zl  0.A n u m b e r o f f e a t u r e s o f F i g u r e 3 a r e w o r t h
noting. First, the optimal value of ˆ GL is very large: roughly 30 percent (recall
that in steady state government purchases are 20 percent of output). Second, for
this particular parameterization the increase in government spending more than
undoes the eect of the shock which made the zero-bound constraint bind. Here,
government purchases rise to the point where the zero bound is marginally non-
binding and output is actually above its steady state level. These last two results
depend on the parameter values that we chose and on our assumed functional
form for v(Gt).W h a ti sr o b u s ta c r o s sd i  e r e n ta s s u m p t i o n si st h a ti ti so p t i m a l
to substantially increase government purchases and that the government-spending
multiplier is large when the zero-bound constraint binds.7
The zero bound and interest rate targeting Up to now we have emphasized
the economy being in the zero-bound state as the reason why the nominal interest
rate might not change after an increase in government spending. Here we discuss
7We derive the optimal ﬁscal policy taking monetary policy as given. Nakata (2009) argues
that it is also optimal to raise government purchases when monetary policy is chosen optimally.
He does so using a second-order Taylor approximation to the utility function in a model with
separable preferences where the natural rate of interest follows an exogenous stochastic process.
27an alternative interpretation of the constant interest rate assumption. Suppose
that there are no shocks to the economy but that, starting from the non-stochastic
steady state, government spending increases by a constant amount and the mon-
etary authority deviates from the Taylor rule, keeping the nominal interest rate
equal to its steady-state value. This policy shock persists with probability p.I ti s
easy to show that the government-spending multiplier is given by equation (3.10).
So the multiplier is exactly the same as in the case in which the nominal inter-
est rate is constant because the zero bound binds. Of course there is no reason
to think that it is sensible for the central bank to pursue a policy that sets the
nominal interest rate equal to a positive constant. For this reason, a binding zero
bound is the most natural interpretation for why the nominal interest rate might
not change after an increase in government spending.
4. A model with capital
In the previous section we use a simple model without capital to argue that the
government-spending multiplier is large whenever the output costs of being in the
zero-bound state are also large. Here we show that this basic result extends to a
generalized version of the previous model in which we allow for capital accumula-
tion. As above we focus on the eect of a discount-rate shock.8
The model The preferences of the representative household are given by equa-
tions (3.1) and (3.2). The household’s budget constraint is given by:
Pt (Ct + It)+Bt+1 = Bt (1 + Rt)+WtNt + Ptr
k
tKt + Tt,( 4 . 1 )
8In a previous version of this paper, available upon request, we also analyse the eect of a
neutral and an investment-speciﬁc technology shock.
28where It denotes investment, Kt is the stock of capital, and rk
t is the real rental
rate of capital. The capital accumulation equation is given by:
Kt+1 = It +( 1 )Kt  D(It,I t1,K t),( 4 . 2 )
where the function D(It,I t1,K t) represents investment adjustment costs. To
assess robustness we consider two speciﬁcations for these adjustment costs. The









Kt.( 4 . 3 )
The parameter I > 0 governs the magnitude of adjustment costs to capital
accumulation. As I  ,i n v e s t m e n ta n dt h es t o c ko fc a p i t a lb e c o m ec o n s t a n t .
The resulting model behaves in a manner very similar to the one described in the
previous section.
The second speciﬁcation is the one considered in Christiano, Eichenbaum and








It.( 4 . 4 )
Here the function S is increasing, convex and satisﬁes the following conditions:
S(1) = S(1) = 0.
The household’s problem is to maximize life-time expected utility, given by
equations (3.1) and (3.2), subject to the resource constraints given by equations
(4.1) and (4.2) and the condition E0 limt Bt+1/[(1+R0)(1+R1)...(1+Rt)]  0.
It is useful to derive an expression for Tobin’s q,i . e . t h ev a l u ei nu n i t so f
consumption of an additional unit of capital. We denote this value by qt.F o r
simplicity we derive this expression using the adjustment costs speciﬁcation (4.3).
















.( 4 . 5 )
Firms The problem of the ﬁnal good producers is the same as in the previous















Output of good i is given by:
Yt (i)=[ Kt (i)]
 [Nt (i)]
1 ,
where Nt (i) and Kt (i) denote the labor and capital employed by the ith monop-
olist.
The monopolist is subject to the same Calvo-style price-setting frictions de-
scribed in Section 2. Recall that  =1 / denotes a subsidy that is proportional to
the costs of production. This subsidy corrects the steady-state ineciency created
by the presence of monopoly power. The variable t+j is the multiplier on the
household budget constraint in the Lagrangian representation of the household
problem. Firm i maximizes its discounted proﬁts, given by equation (4.6), sub-
ject to the Calvo price-setting friction, the production function, and the demand
function for Yt (i),g i v e nb ye q u a t i o n( 2 . 4 ) .
The monetary policy rule is given by equation (2.6).
Equilibrium The economy’s resource constraint is:
Ct + It + Gt = Yt. (4.7)
30A‘ m o n e t a r ye q u i l i b r i u m ’i sac o l l e c t i o no fs t o c h a s t i cp r o c e s s e s ,
{Ct,I t,N t,K t,W t,P t,Y t,R t,P t (i),r
k
t,Y t (i),N t (i),t,B t+1,t},
such that for given {dt,G t},t h eh o u s e h o l da n dﬁ r mp r o b l e m sa r es a t i s ﬁ e d ,t h e
monetary policy rule given by equation (2.6) is satisﬁed, markets clear, and the
aggregate resource constraint holds.
Experiment At time zero the economy is in its non-stochastic steady state. At
time one agents learn that rL diers from its steady state value for T periods and
then returns to its steady state value. We consider a shock that is suciently
large so that the zero bound on the nominal interest rate binds between two time
periods that we denote by t1 and t2,w h e r e1  t1  t2  T.9 We solve the model
using a shooting algorithm. In practice the key determinants of the multiplier are
t1 and t2.T om a i n t a i nc o m p a r a b i l i t yw i t ht h ep r e v i o u ss e c t i o nw ek e e pt h es i z e
of the discount factor shock the same and choose T =1 0 .I nt h i sc a s et1 equals
one and t2 equals six. Consequently, the length for which the zero bound binds
after a discount rate shock is roughly the same as in the model without capital.
With the exception of I and  all parameters are the same as in the economy
without capital. We set  equal to 0.02.W e c h o o s e t h e v a l u e o f I so that the
elasticity of I/K with respect to q is equal to the value implied by the estimates
in Eberly, Rebelo, and Vincent (2008).10 The resulting value of I is equal to 17.
We compute the government spending multiplier under the assumption that Gt
increases by ˆ G percent for as long as the zero bound binds. In general, the increase
in Gt aects the time period over which the zero bound binds. Consequently we
9The precise timing of when the zero-bound constraint is binding may not be unique.
10Eberly, Rebelo and Vincent (2008) obtain a point estimate of b equal to 0.06 in the regression
I/K = a+bln(q). This estimate implies a steady state elasticity of It/Kt with respect to Tobin’s
q of 0.06/.O u r t h e o r e t i c a l m o d e l i m p l i e s t h a t t h i s e l a s t i c i t y i s e q u a l t o (I)
1.E q u a t i n g
these two elasticities yields a value of I of 17.
31proceed as follows. Guess a value for t1 and t2.I n c r e a s eGt for the period t  [t1,
t2].C h e c kt h a tt h ez e r ob o u n db i n d sf o rt  [t1, t2].I fn o tr e v i s et h eg u e s sf o rt1
and t2.
Denote by ˆ Yt the percentage deviation of output from steady state that results
from a shock that puts the economy into the zero-bound state holding Gt con-
stant. Let ˆ Y 
t denote the percentage deviation of output from steady state that
results from the both the original shock and the increase in government purchases







t  ˆ Yt
ˆ G
.
As a reference point we note that when the zero bound is not binding the
government-spending multiplier is roughly 0.9.T h i sv a l u ei sl o w e rt h a nt h ev a l u e
of the multiplier in the model without capital. This lower value reﬂects the fact
that an increase in government spending tends to increase real interest rates and
crowd out private investment. This eect is not present in the model without
capital.
We now consider the eect of an increase in the discount factor from its steady
state value of four percent (APR) to 1 percent (APR). The solid line in Figure
4d i s p l a y st h ed y n a m i cr e s p o n s eo ft h ee c o n o m yt ot h i ss h o c k . T h ez e r ob o u n d
binds in periods one through six. The higher discount rate leads to substantial
declines in investment, hours worked, output, and consumption. The large fall in
output is associated with a fall in marginal cost and substantial deﬂation. Since
the nominal interest rate is zero, the real interest rate rises sharply. We now
discuss the intuition for how the presence of investment aects the response of the
economy to a discount rate shock. We begin by analyzing why a rise in the real
interest rate is associated with a sharp decline in investment. Ignoring covariance






































where st is the inverse of the markup rate. Equation (4.8) implies that in equi-
librium the household equates the returns to two dierent ways of investing one
unit of consumption. The ﬁrst strategy is to invest in a bond that yields the real
interest rate deﬁned by the left-hand side of equation (4.8). The second strategy
involves converting the consumption good into 1/qt units of installed capital. The
return to this capital has three components. The ﬁrst component is the mar-
ginal product of capital (the ﬁrst term on the right-hand side of equation (4.8)).
The second component is the value of the undepreciated capital in consumption
units, qt+1 (1  ).T h et h i r dc o m p o n e n ti st h ev a l u ei nc o n s u m p t i o nu n i t so ft h e
reduction in adjustment costs associated with an increase in installed capital.
To provide intuition it is useful to consider two extreme cases, inﬁnite adjust-
ment costs (I = )a n dz e r oa d j u s t m e n tc o s t s( I =0 ). Suppose ﬁrst that
adjustment costs are inﬁnite. Figure 1 displays a stylized version of this economy.
Investment is ﬁxed and saving is an increasing function of the real interest rate.
The increase in the discount factor can be thought of as inducing a rightward shift
in the saving curve. When this shift is very large, the real interest rate cannot
fall enough to re-establish equilibrium. The intuition for this result and the role
played by the zero bound on nominal interest rates is the same as in the model
without capital. That model also provides intuition for why the equilibrium is
characterized by a large, temporary fall in output, deﬂation, and a rise in the real
interest rate.
Suppose now that there are no adjustment costs (I =0 ). In this case Tobin’s










t+1 st+1 +( 1 )

.
According to this equation an increase in the real interest rate must be matched
by an increase in the marginal product of capital. In general the latter is accom-
plished, at least in part, by a fall in Kt+1 caused by a large drop in investment.
In Figure 1 the downward sloping curve labeled ‘elastic investment’ depicts the
negative relation between the real interest rate and investment in the absence of
any adjustment costs. As drawn, the shift in the saving curve moves the equilib-
rium to point C and does not cause the zero bound to bind. So, the result of an
increase in the discount rate is a fall in the real interest rate and a rise in saving
and investment.
Now consider a value of I that is between zero and inﬁnity. In this case both
investment and q respond to the shift in the discount factor. For our parameter
values, the higher the adjustment costs the more likely it is that the zero bound
binds. In terms of Figure 1 a higher value of I can be thought of as generating a
steeper slope in the investment curve, thus increasing the likelihood that the zero
bound binds.
Suppose that the zero bound binds. Other things equal, a higher real interest
rate increases desired saving and decreases desired investment. So the fall in
output required to equate the two must be larger than in an economy without
investment. This larger fall in output is undone by an increase in government
purchases.11 Consistent with this intuition Figure 4 shows that the government-
spending multiplier is very large when the zero bound binds (on impact dY/dG
is roughly equal to four). This multiplier is actually larger than in the model
11As in the model without capital the increase in income in states where the zero bound binds
raises permanent income which raises desired expenditures in zero bound states. This additional
channel reinforces the intertemporal channel stressed in the text.
34without capital.12
An a t u r a lq u e s t i o ni sw h a th a p p e n st ot h es i z eo ft h em u l t i p l i e ra sw ei n c r e a s e
the size of the shock. Recall that in the model without capital, as long as the zero
bound binds, the size of the shock does not aect the size of the multiplier. The
analogue result here, established using numerical methods, is that the size of the
shock does not aect the multiplier as long as it does not aect t1 and t2.F o ra
given t1 the size of the multiplier is decreasing in t2.F o re x a m p l e ,s u p p o s et h a t
shock is such that t2 is equal to four instead of the benchmark value of six. In
this case the value of the multiplier falls from 3.9 to 2.3.T h el a t t e rv a l u ei ss t i l l
much larger than 0.9,t h ev a l u eo ft h em u l t i p l i e rw h e nt h ez e r ob o u n dd o e sn o t
bind.
We conclude by considering the eect of using the adjustment-cost speciﬁca-
tion given by equation (4.4) rather than equation (4.3). The dashed line in Figure
4d i s p l a y st h ed y n a m i cr e s p o n s eo ft h ee c o n o m yt ot h ed i s c o u n tr a t es h o c k .F o u r
key results emerge. First, the response of investment is smaller with the new
adjustment cost speciﬁcation which directly penalizes changes in investment. Sec-
ond, while large the multiplier (2.6 on impact) is somewhat smaller with the new
investment cost speciﬁcation. This result reﬂects the smaller response of invest-
ment. Third, the dynamic responses of the other variables are similar across the
two adjustment cost speciﬁcations. Fourth, the values of t1 and t2,i n d i c a t i n gt h e
period of time over which the zero bound binds are the same. We conclude that
the main results regarding the zero bound are robust across the two.
5. The multiplier in a medium-size DSGE model
In the previous sections we built intuition about the size of the government-
spending multiplier using a series of simple new-Keynesian models. In this section
12This multiplier is computed setting ˆ G to one percent.
35we investigate the determinants of the multiplier in the version of ACEL in which
capital is ﬁrm speciﬁc. The model includes a variety of frictions that are useful for
explaining aggregate time-series data. These frictions include sticky wages, sticky
prices, variable capital utilization, and the CEE investment adjustment-cost spec-
iﬁcation. In what follows all notation is the same as in the previous sections,
unless noted otherwise.
The ﬁnal good is produced using a continuum of intermediate goods according
to the production function and market structure described in Section 2. Interme-






,( 5 . 1 )
where 0 <<1. Here, Nt(i) and ¯ Kt(i) denote time t labor and capital services
used to produce the ith intermediate good. The parameter , represents a ﬁxed
cost of production. The services of capital, ¯ Kt(i),a r er e l a t e dt os t o c ko fp h y s i c a l
capital, Kt(i), by
¯ Kt(i)=ut(i)Kt(i).
Here ut(i) is the utilization rate. The cost in investment goods of setting the
utilization rate to ut(i) is given by a(ut(i))Kt(i),w h e r ea(ut) is increasing and
convex. We deﬁne a = a(1)/a(1)  0 and impose that ut =1and a(1) = 0 in
steady state.
Intermediate-good ﬁrms own their capital, which they cannot adjust within
the period. They can only change their stock of capital over time by varying
the rate of investment. A ﬁrm’s stock of physical capital evolves according to
equations (4.2) and (4.4).
Intermediate good ﬁrms purchase labor services in a perfectly competitive
labor market at the wage rate Wt.F i r m sm u s tb o r r o wt h ew a g eb i l li na d v a n c e
from ﬁnancial intermediaries at the gross interest rate, Rt.P r o ﬁ t sa r ed i s t r i b u t e d
36to households at the end of each time period.
With one modiﬁcation, intermediate-good ﬁrms set their price subject to the
Calvo (1983) frictions described in Section 2. The modiﬁcation is that a ﬁrm
which cannot re-optimize its price sets Pt(i) according to: Pt(i)=t1Pt1(i).





t+jt+j{Pt+j (i)Yt+j (i)  Wt+jRt+jNt+j (i) (5.2)
[Pt+jIt+j(i)+Pt+ja(ut+j(i))K(i)t+j]}
There is a continuum of households indexed by j  (0,1). Each household is
am o n o p o l ys u p p l i e ro fad i  e r e n t i a t e dl a b o rs e r v i c e ,a n ds e t si t sw a g es u b j e c tt o
Calvo-style wage frictions as in Erceg, Henderson, and Levin (2000). Household
j sells its labor at a wage rate Wj,t to a representative competitive ﬁrm that









, 1  w < .
This ﬁrm sells the composite labor service to intermediate good ﬁrms at a price
Wt.
We assume that there exist complete contingent claims markets. So, in equi-
librium all household consume the same amount and have the same asset holdings.















,( 5 . 3 )
where E
j
t is the time t expectation operator, conditional on household j’s time t
information set. The parameter b>0 governs the degree of habit formation in
37consumption. The household’s budget constraint is:
Mt+1 = Rt [Mt  Qt +( xt  1)M
a
t ]+Aj,t + Qt (5.4)
+Wj,tNj,t + Dt  (1 +  (Vt))PtCt  Tt.
Here Mt,Q t and Wj,t denote the household’s stock of money at the beginning
of period t,c a s hb a l a n c e sa n dt i m et nominal wage rate, respectively. Also, Tt
denotes period-t lump-sum taxes. Each household has a diversiﬁed portfolio of
claims on all the intermediate good ﬁrms. The variable Dt represents period t ﬁrm
proﬁts. The variable Ai,t, denotes the net cash inﬂow from participating in state-
contingent securities at time t.T h ev a r i a b l ext, represents the gross growth rate
of the economy-wide per capita stock of money, Ma
t . The quantity (xt1)Ma
t is a
lump-sum payment made to households by the monetary authority. The household
deposits Mt  Qt +( xt  1)Ma
t with a ﬁnancial intermediary. The variable Vt,
denotes the time t velocity of the household’s cash balances: Vt =( PtCt)/Qt.
The function (Vt) captures the role of cash balances in facilitating transactions.
This function is increasing and convex. The ﬁrst-order condition for Qt implies












We parameterize  (·) indirectly by choosing steady state values for , V and .
Financial intermediaries receive MtQt+(xt  1)Mt from the household. Our
notation reﬂects the equilibrium condition, Ma
t = Mt. Financial intermediaries
lend all of their money to intermediate good ﬁrms, which use the funds to pay the
wage bill. Loan market clearing requires that:
WtHt = xtMt  Qt. (5.5)
The aggregate resource constraint is:
[1 + (Vt)]Ct +[ It + a(ut)Kt]=Yt. (5.6)
38The monetary policy rule is given by equation (2.6).
Assigning values to model parameters In our analysis, we assume that the
ﬁnancial crisis began in the third quarter of 2008. For our experiments we require
that the level of the interest rate in the model coincides with that in the data in
the second quarter of 2008. A simple way to do this is to suppose that the model
is in steady state in the second quarter of 2008 with a nominal interest rate of 2
percent. To this end, we set  =0 .9999 and x =1 .0049.
We assume that intermediate-good ﬁrms set their prices once a year (P =
0.75). In conjunction with the other model parameters, the ﬁrm-speciﬁc capital
version of ACEL implies that the coecient on marginal cost in the new-Keynesian
Phillips curve is 0.0026.T h e l o w v a l u e o f t h i s c o e  c i e n t i s c o n s i s t e n t w i t h t h e
evidence presented in Figure 4 of ACEL. We set W equal to 0.72,t h ep o i n t
estimate in ACEL, so that households reoptimize wages roughly once a year. We
set the habit formation parameter b to 0.70,av a l u es i m i l a rt ot h ep o i n te s t i m a t e s
in ACEL and CEE. The quarterly rate of depreciation rate, ,i s0.02.W e s e t
the parameter  to 0.3.I n c o n j u n c t i o n w i t h t h e o t h e r p a r a m e t e r v a l u e s , t h i s
value of  generates a steady-state value of It/(Ct + It + Gt) equal to 0.29,t h e
average value of this ratio in U.S. data over the period from 1960Q1 to 2010Q1.
The precise measures of these variables are discussed below.
We set S(1), ,a n da to the values estimated in ACEL (3.28, 0.80,a n d2.02,
respectively). We set the parameter  to ensure that the steady-state proﬁts of
intermediate-goods ﬁrms are zero. We set the steady-state values of V , , f and
w to the values used in ACEL (0.45, 0.036, 1.01,a n d1.05,r e s p e c t i v e l y ) . W e
ﬁnd that our results are robust to perturbations in this last set of parameters.
Finally, we assume that monetary policy is conducted according to the Taylor
rule described in equation (2.6) with 1 =0 .25, 2 =1 .5,a n d =0 .
39The multiplier in ACEL Figure 5 reports the value of the multiplier implied
by the model under dierent scenarios. The ﬁrst row of Figure 5 shows that the
value of the government-spending multiplier when monetary policy is governed
by a Taylor rule and the zero bound is not binding. We consider the case where
government spending increases by a constant amount for eight and twelve quarters,
respectively. The key result here is that during the ﬁrst eight quarters in which
the experiments are comparable the multiplier is higher in the ﬁrst case than in
the second case. This result is consistent with the analysis in Section 2 which
argues that, when the Taylor rule is operative, the magnitude of the multiplier is
decreasing in the persistence of the shock to government spending.
The ﬁrst row of Figure 5 also shows the value of the government spending
multiplier when an increase in government spending coincides with a nominal in-
terest rate that is constant, say because the zero bound binds.13 Interestingly,
when government spending rises for only eight quarters, the government-spending
multiplier is roughly 1.2. When the Taylor rule is operative the multiplier is
smaller. It starts at roughly one and declines to about 0.7.W h e n g o v e r n m e n t
spending rises for twelve quarters there is a much larger dierence between the
Taylor rule case and the zero-bound case. In the latter case the impact multiplier
is roughly 1.6.T h em u l t i p l i e r r i s e si n a h u m p - s h a p e d m a n n e r ,a t t a i n i n g ap e a k
value of roughly 2.3 after ﬁve periods. The hump-shaped response of the multiplier
reﬂects the endogenous sources of persistence present in ACEL, e.g. habit forma-
tion in consumption and investment adjustment costs. The zero-bound multiplier
is substantially larger when the zero bound binds for twelve periods rather than
for eight periods. This result is consistent with a central ﬁnding of this paper:
the government spending multiplier is larger the more severe is the zero-bound
13Recall that the value of the multiplier does not depend on why the nominal interest rate is
constant. Given this property, we study the size of the multiplier in ACEL without specifying
either the type or the magnitude of the shock that makes the zero bound binding.
40problem.14
The second row of Figure 5 provides information to address the following
question: how sensitive is the multiplier to the proportion of government spend-
ing that occurs while the nominal interest rate is zero? The ﬁgure displays the
government-spending multipliers when government spending goes up for 12, 16,
and 24 periods. In all cases the nominal interest rate is zero for 12 periods and
follows a Taylor rule thereafter. So, in the three cases the proportion of govern-
ment spending that comes online while the nominal interest rate is zero is 100,
75,a n d50 percent, respectively.
Our basic result is that the multipliers are higher the larger is the percentage
of the spending that comes online when the nominal interest rate is zero. This
result holds even in the ﬁrst 12 periods when the increase in government spending
is the same in all three cases. For example, the peak multiplier falls from roughly
2.3 to 1.06 as we go from the ﬁrst to the third case. This decline is consistent
with our discussion of the sensitivity of the multiplier to the timing of government
spending in Section 3. A key lesson from this analysis is that if ﬁscal policy is
to be used to combat a shock that sends the economy into the zero bound, it is
critical that the spending come on line when the economy is actually in the zero
bound. Spending that occurs after that yields very little bang for the buck and
actually dulls the impact of the spending that comes on line when the zero bound
binds.
Using a model similar to ACEL, Cogan, Cwik, Taylor, and Wieland (2010)
study the impact of increases in government spending when the nominal interest
rate is set to zero for one or two years. A common feature of their experiments
is that the bulk of the increase in government spending comes on line when the
14For completeness we also considered the case in which the zero bound binds for only four
quarters. In this case the zero-bound multiplier and the multiplier when the Taylor rule is
operative are very similar.
41nominal interest rate is no longer constant. Consistent with our results, Cogan et
al. (2010) ﬁnd modest values for the government-spending multiplier.
The model’s performance during the crisis period The ACEL model and
close variants of it do a good job at accounting for the key properties of U.S.
time series data in the period before the ﬁnancial crisis (see, for example, ACEL
and Smets and Wouters (2007)). One natural question is whether the model
generates sensible predictions for the current crisis under the assumption that the
zero bound binds.
The solid lines in Figure 6 display time-series data for the period 2000Q1-
2010Q1 for real per capita output, private consumption, investment, government
consumption, inﬂation, and the Federal Funds rate. The data displayed are the
percentage change in a variable from its value in 2000Q1. All per capita variables
are computed using as a measure of the population the civilian noninstitutional
population, 16 years and over. All variables with the exception of inﬂation and
the interest rate are seasonally adjusted and computed as real chained-weighted
billions of 2005 U.S. dollars.15 Output is the sum of consumption, investment
and government consumption.16 We also discuss results when we use real GDP
15To aggregate real chain-weighted data we proceed as follows. Denote two nominal quantities
by ˜ x1t and ˜ x2t and the two associated price indices by p1t and p2t. The real quantities are given
by: xit =˜ xit/pit,i=1 ,2. The growth rate of the price of the aggregate, t, is the geometric av-









for t>1.W e o b t a i n a t i m e s e r i e s o n t h e p r i c e o f xt, pt, by setting this price in some initial
condition and solving: pt = tpt1,p 0 =1 ,for t =1 ,...,T. The real quantity of the aggregate
is:˜ xt =( ˜ x1t +˜ x2t)/pt,t=0 ,...,T.
16If we construct output using the procedure for chain-weighting discussed above, the equation
Yt = Ct + It + Gt does not hold. Since this equation holds in the model we report an empirical
measure of output for which this equation also holds. This measure is a weighted average of
chain-weighted Ct, It,a n dGt where the weights are 56, 29 and 15 percent, respectively. These
weights are the sample averages of the nominal shares of the three series. Since we report the
model’s implications for Ct, It,a n dGt separately, the reader can assess the model’s implications
for the individual components of our measure of output.
42as the measure of output. Private consumption is consumption of nondurables
and services. Investment is household purchases of durable goods, federal gov-
ernment investment, and gross private domestic investment. Total government
consumption is federal government consumption and state and local expenditures
on consumption and investment.17 Inﬂation is the year over year growth rate in
the core consumer price index. The interest rate is the Federal Funds rate.
We date the beginning of the ﬁnancial crisis as the third quarter of 2008. This
is the quarter during which Lehman Brothers collapsed. We are interested in
computing the eect of the ﬁnancial crisis on the evolution of the U.S. economy.
To this end we forecast the variables reported in Figure 6 using data up to and
including the second quarter of 2008. With the exception of output, inﬂation and
the interest rate we compute our forecasts using a four lag scalar autoregression ﬁt
to the level of the data. The output forecast is equal to the weighted sum of the
forecasted values of consumption, investment, and government purchases. The
forecasts for the interest rate and inﬂation are equal to the level of these variables
in 2008Q2. These forecasts are displayed as the dotted lines in Figure 6.
Ar o u g hm e a s u r eo ft h ei m p a c to ft h ec r i s i so nt h ev a r i a b l e si n c l u d e di nF i g u r e
6i st h ed i  e r e n c eb e t w e e nt h ea c t u a la n dt h ef o r e c a s t e dv a l u e so ft h e s ev a r i a b l e s .
These dierences, i.e. the impulse response functions to the shocks that precip-
itated the crisis, are displayed as the solid lines in Figure 7. It is evident that
the nominal interest rate fell very quickly and hit the zero bound. There was a
signiﬁcant drop in consumption and a very large fall in investment. Output fell by
seven percent. Inﬂation fell by one percent relative to what it would been absent
the crisis. Despite the ﬁscal stimulus plan enacted in February 2009 (the Ameri-
can Recovery and Reinvestment Act), total government consumption rose by only
17We include state and local government consumption and investment in our measure of
government consumption because data on real state and local government investment is not
available for the period before 1995.
43two percent. Total government purchases, which includes both consumption and
investment, rose by even less. This result reﬂects two facts. First, a substantial
part of the stimulus plan involved an increase in transfers to households. Second,
there was a large fall in state and local purchases that oset a substantial part of
the increase in federal government purchases.18
To assess the model’s implication for the crisis period we need to specify the
shocks that made the zero bound binding. In our view the crisis was precipitated
by disturbances in ﬁnancial markets that increased the spread between the return
on savings and the return on investment. The ﬁnancial crisis and the resulting
uncertainty led to a large rise in the household’s desire to save. Consistent with
this view the personal savings rate rose sharply from roughly two percent in 2007
to a level that stabilized at around 5.5 percent.19 The ACEL model is not su-
ciently rich to provide a detailed account of the ﬁnancial crisis or the steep rise in
household saving. We mimic the eects of the crisis by introducing the discount
factor shock discussed in the previous sections, as well as a ﬁnancial friction shock.
The ACEL model assumes that ﬁrms ﬁnance investment out of retained earn-
ings. We imagine that each dollar passing between households and ﬁrms goes
through the ﬁnancial system. In normal times every dollar transferred between
households and ﬁrms uses up  dollars’ worth of ﬁnal goods. Thus, we replace t+j
in (5.2) with t+j (1  ). Abstracting from general equilibrium eects on t+j in
(5.2), the value of  does not aect the ﬁrm’s decisions, as long as it is constant.20
We assume that  is constant until 2008Q2 and that agents expected it to remain
18See Cogan and Taylor (2010) for a detailed analysis of the impact of the American Recovery
and Reinvestment Act on government spending.
19These observations are based on the saving rate, PSAVERT, obtained from the Federal
Reserve Bank of St. Louis website.
20The general equilibrium eect operates through the impact of  on the aggregate resource
constraint. In our computations, we abstract from this general equilibrium eect on the grounds
that it is presumably small.
44constant forever. At the onset of the ﬁnancial crisis in 2008Q3, agents learn that






We suppose that k > 0 for t corresponding to the ﬁrst period of the crisis (i.e.,
2008Q3)u n t i lt h el a s tp e r i o d ,t = T, of the crisis. We suppose that k
t =0for
t>T.21
The ith intermediate good ﬁrm maximizes the modiﬁed version of (5.2) that ac-
commodates k























t+1 denote the cross-section average return on capital, i.e. the average across
i of Rk
t+1 (i).O n em e a s u r eo ft h ei n t e r e s tr a t es p r e a di nt h em o d e li st h ed i  e r -
ence between Rk







. This dierence is equal to k
t+1Rk
t+1.
Our assumption that k
t rose during the crisis is essentially equivalent to the
assumption that our measure of the interest rate spread rose. In reality, interest
rate spreads move for many reasons, e.g., changes in bankruptcy risk, changes in
liquidity and conﬁdence in the banking system. In the wake of the 2008 ﬁnancial
crisis, virtually all interest rate spreads rose dramatically. Consider, for example,
the behavior of the interest spreads on non-AAA corporate bonds relative to
AAA bonds. In the case of BAA, BB, B and ‘junk’, deﬁned as CCC and lower
21With this formulation, the constant, post-crisis level of  is higher than the pre-crisis level
of .
45rated bonds, the average value of the spread is 0.88, 1.75, 2.71 and 5.75 percent,
respectively, over the period, 2005-2007. These spreads rose to peak values of
3.38, 8.83, 14.10,a n d27.72 at the end of 2008.22 Thereafter, spreads declined to
values of 1.20, 2.36, 3.87,a n d7.88,r e s p e c t i v e l y ,b y2 0 1 0 Q 3 . 23
With these data as background, we set k =3 .6/400 and T =1 2 .T h i s
assumption implies that at the time of the crisis, the interest rate spread on
at h r e ey e a rb o n dj u m p sb y3 . 6p e r c e n t a g ep o i n t sa ta na n n u a lr a t ea n dt h e n
declines linearly back to zero after three years.24 We focus on the three year
bond because the work of Barclay and Smith (1995) and Stohs and Mauer (1996)
suggests that the average duration of corporate debt is in the range of three to
four years.25
We assume that Gt increases by two percent for as long as the zero bound
binds. As in Section 4 we compute the time interval t  [t1, t2] during which the
zero bound binds. We ﬁnd that t1 =2and t2 =1 1 ,s ot h ez e r ob i n d sf r o mt h e
fourth quarter of 2008 until the third quarter of 2011.
The dash-dotted line in Figure 7 corresponds to the model’s predictions for
the economy during the crisis. A number of features are worth noting. First, the
model accounts for the rapid decline of the federal funds rate at the onset of the
crisis. Second, the model is consistent with the observed declines in consumption,
investment and output. Third, and perhaps most importantly, the model also does
22The analysis is based on quarterly averaged data. The peak of the BB and B bond spreads
occurs in 2008Q4 and the peak in the junk bond spreads occurs in 2009Q1.
23All rates are in annual, percent terms.
24At time t, we calculate the interest rate spread on a three-year bond by taking the three
year forward averages of quarterly interest rate spreads.
25See Stohs and Mauer (1996, Table 2). Barclay and Smith do not directly report average
durations. Instead, they report the percent of debt that matures in more than n years, for
n =1 ,2,3,4,5. These percentages are 73, 65.7 58.7, 52.2, 45.9 respectively. These numbers
imply an average duration if one makes an assumption about the mean duration for ﬁrms with
n>5. For example, if this mean duration is 7.5, then mean duration is 4.2 years, where
4.2=1 .5  0.073 + 2.5  0.070 + 3.5  0.065 + 4.5  0.063 + 7.5  0.459.
46ag o o dj o bo fa c c o u n t i n gf o rt h ep o s t - c r i s i sb e h a v i o ro fi n ﬂ a t i o n . A c c o r d i n gt o
our estimates inﬂation fell by roughly one percent as a result of the crisis (see the
solid line in Figure 7). The model’s predictions are consistent with this decline.
To assess robustness with respect to our output measure Figure 7 reports the
dierence between the log level and the univariate forecast of per capita real GDP.
This dierence is displayed as the dashed line in the subplot labeled ‘Output’. No-
tice that the paths of the two real output measures are very similar. Interestingly,
our measure of output falls by somewhat more than per capita real GDP. For
example, the maximal impact of the crisis is seven percent and 5.8 percent decline
in our measure of output and real GDP, respectively. If we calibrate the model to
match the fall in real GDP we would generate less deﬂation and smaller declines
in consumption and investment.
We conclude by noting that, consistent with the data, in our simulations gov-
ernment purchases rise by only two percent for 11 periods. Recall from Figure 5
that the peak value of the multiplier in ACEL is 2.3.S ot h er i s ei ng o v e r n m e n t
purchases accounts for, at most, a 0.7 of one percent rise in annual GDP.26 The
modest contribution of government purchases to the recovery reﬂects the very
modest increase in government spending, rather than a small multiplier.
6. The Multiplier with Distortionary Taxation
In this section we consider how the presence of distortionary taxation aects the
government spending multiplier when the zero bound binds. Baxter and King
(1993) show that the size of the government spending multiplier implied by the
neoclassical growth model is sensitive to the requirement that spending be ﬁnanced
with distortionary taxes. For example, when they require that government spend-
26We base this calculation on the fact that dY/Y =( dY/dG)(dG/G)(G/Y ) and the assump-
tion that G/Y =0 .15.
47ing be ﬁnanced on a period-by-period basis with distortionary taxes on income,
the multiplier actually becomes negative. This result reﬂects that increases in
distortionary taxes reduce output in the neoclassical growth model.
An a t u r a lq u e s t i o ni s : h o ws e n s i t i v ea r eo u rc o n c l u s i o n st ot h ep r e s e n c eo f
distortionary taxes? Eggertsson (2010, 2011) shows that the eects of distor-
tionary taxes can be very dierent depending on whether the zero lower bound
binds or not. Indeed, some distortionary taxes that lower output when the zero
lower bound does not bind actually raise output when the zero bound does bind.
Of course, if the tax that ﬁnances government spending actually increases output
then the government spending multiplier is actually increased.
For example, Eggertsson (2010, 2011) shows that increasing labor income taxes
when the zero bound binds leads to a rise in output. The intuition for this result is
as follows. Suppose that prices are sticky but wages are fully ﬂexible. Other things
equal, an increase in the labor income tax rate, L
t ,i se q u i v a l e n tt oar e d u c t i o n
in the supply of labor. The resulting rise in the real wage rate leads to a rise in
marginal cost and a rise in inﬂation. As long as the zero bound binds, a rise in
inﬂation leads to a fall in the real interest rate and a rise in consumption and
output. The rise in output generates a further rise in inﬂation, a further decline
in the real interest rate and an additional rise in output. So, the net eect of an
increase in L
t while the zero bound binds is potentially a large rise in output and
tax revenues. So here an increase in government spending has a bigger impact
on output if it is ﬁnanced by a rise in labor income taxes rather than lump-sum
taxes.
Now, suppose that both prices and wages are sticky as in ACEL. Christiano
(2011) argues that the quantitative eects associated with an increase in distor-
tionary taxes is still positive but smaller than when wages are ﬂexible. The basic
reason is that, with Calvo-style sticky wages, employment is demand determined.
48Consequently, labor supply eects are less important as they only directly eect
the workers who reset their wages.
Christiano’s (2011) analysis is based on a model with no capital accumulation.
Here we consider the quantitative eects of a labor income tax in the version of
the ACEL model discussed above. Figure 8 depicts the size of the government
spending multiplier when there is a one percent increase in government purchases
that lasts for the 12 periods during which the zero lower bound binds. The solid
line corresponds to the benchmark case in which all taxes are lump sum. The
dashed and dotted lines correspond to the cases in which L
t rises from zero to one
percent in quarters one to 12 and 13 to 24, respectively. The key result is that,
regardless of when L
t is increased, the multiplier is higher than when taxes are
lump sum.
The intuition for why the multiplier goes up when L
t increases in periods one
to 12 is discussed above. To understand why output falls after period 12 recall
that the rise in L
t leads to a fall in the real interest rate during the ﬁrst 12
periods by raising anticipated inﬂation. This fall induces households to substitute
consumption from the future to the present. Consequently output falls after period
12 when the rise in L
t is reversed.
Now consider the case where L
t rises in periods 12 to 24. An increase in
future values of L
t raises future marginal cost and inﬂation. In the presence of
staggered pricing the ﬁrms that can change their prices in periods one through
12 raise their prices in anticipation of future inﬂation. As long as the zero bound
binds, this eect lowers the real interest rate, thus contributing to a rise in output.
Not surprisingly, the eect on the multiplier is smaller than when the rise in L
t
coincides with the increase in government spending.
The previous discussion makes clear that ﬁnancing government spending with
distortionary labor income taxes would increase, not decrease, the multiplier, at
49least in the ﬁrst 12 quarters. In this sense the main conclusions stressed in Section
5a r er o b u s tt oa l l o w i n gf o rd i s t o r t i o n a r yt a x e s .
An alternative to increasing taxes on labor income is to raise taxes on capital
income. As it turns out, the eects of capital taxes are surprisingly subtle. Outside
of the zero bound it does not matter whether ﬁrms or households pay the capital
income taxes. But, when the zero bound binds it does matter. Recall that Rk
t+1
denotes the average rate of return on capital across ﬁrms. Let the tax rate on
capital be k
t.S u p p o s e t h a t ﬁ r m s p a y t h e c a p i t a l t a x .T h e n , f o r a g i v e n l e v e l
of Rk
t+1,a ni n c r e a s ei nk
t leads to a fall in the demand for investment goods by
ﬁrms. In equilibrium this eect leads to a fall in investment, output, marginal
cost, and inﬂation. So, other things equal, an increase in k
t can potentially make
the zero bound binding or exacerbate an existing zero-bound problem. Note that
an increase in the capital tax born by the ﬁrms is isomorphic to an increase in the
costs of ﬁnancial intermediation (k
t)t h a tw eu s e di no u rd i s c u s s i o no ft h er e c e n t
ﬁnancial crisis.27 So, we have already analyzed this type of capital income tax
above. It follows that if an increase in government consumption is ﬁnanced by a
capital income tax paid by ﬁrms, then the multiplier is smaller than if lump sum
taxes are used.
Now suppose that households pay the capital taxes. Then an increase in k
t
leads to a reduction in savings and to an increase in consumption, output and
inﬂation. So, other things equal, an increase in k
t makes the zero bound less
binding if it was binding to begin with. This type of capital income tax is the
one considered in Eggertsson (2011). As in the labor income tax case, ﬁnancing
government spending with an increase in the capital income tax rate that is paid
by households leads to an increase in the multiplier.
27In making this statement, we ignore the fact that a capital tax rate paid by the ﬁrm and
resources used in intermediation have dierent eects on the economy’s resource constraint.
Recall that in our analysis of the ﬁnancial crisis we assume this eect is negligible.
50We conclude by noting that an obvious alternative to increasing government
spending to deal with the zero lower bound problem is to manipulate the demand
for goods by varying the time proﬁle of investment tax credits or consumption
taxes. Here we brieﬂy comment on the latter.28 In the context of the Japanese
zero lower-bound episode, Feldstein (2003) proposes raising the value-added tax
(VAT) by one percent per quarter and simultaneously reducing income tax rates
to keep revenue unchanged, continuing this policy for several years until the VAT
reaches 20 percent. Correia, Fahri, Nicolini, and Teles (2010) argue that if taxes on
consumption, labor, and capital income are state contingent every allocation that
can be implemented with a combination of taxes and monetary policy that does
not necessarily respect the zero lower bound constraint can also be implemented
with a dierent combination of taxes and monetary policy that does respect the
zero lower bound constraint.
It is evident that the policies envisioned by Feldstein (2003) and by Correia et
al (2010) were not pursued in the U.S. Implementing these policies would require
introducing a national consumption tax.29 We are skeptical about introducing
an e ws o u r c eo fn a t i o n a lt a x a t i o nt od e a lw i t hr a r ee v e n t sl i k et h ez e r o - l o w e r -
bound problem. Our skepticism stems from the political-economy literature that
tries to explain why modern economies do not rely more heavily on consumption
taxes (e.g. Brennan and Buchanan (1977) and Krusell, Quadrini, and Rios-Rull
(1996)). A key insight from this literature is that if government revenue is used
for redistributive purposes, then consumption taxes may be welfare decreasing by
comparison with income taxes. Income taxes are attractive precisely because they
are more distortionary. Since it is more costly to raise revenues with income taxes,
28See Eggertsson (2011) for a discussion of the eects of investment tax credits.
29There are, of course, sales taxes at the state and local level but, presumably, it would have
been dicult and time consuming to coordinate changes in these tax rates. There were programs
such as cash for clunkers but these were small in scale.
51there are less transfers in equilibrium. Krusell et al (1996) emphasize that in their
model, switching from an income to a consumption tax system typically does not
make the median voter better o. But changing from income to consumption
taxes can make everybody worse o.
Many countries already have value-added taxes but even here we are skeptical
of the feasibility of the policies proposed by Feldstein (2003) and Correia et al
(2010). This skepticism stems from the need to introduce a complicated state-
dependent tax policy to deal with the rare occasions in which the zero bound
binds. It is possible that a simpliﬁed version of the tax policies envisioned by
Correia et al (2010) would be desirable. Understanding the quantitative welfare
properties of simple tax policies versus increases in government spending as a way
of dealing with the zero-bound problem is an important topic that we leave for
future research.
7. Conclusion
In this paper we argue that the government-spending multiplier can be very large
when the nominal interest rates is constant. We focus on a natural case in which
the interest rate is constant, which is when the zero lower bound on nominal
interest rates binds. In these economies the government-spending multiplier is
quite modest when monetary policy is governed by a Taylor rule.
Our analysis abstracts from a host of political economy considerations which
might make an increase in government spending less attractive than our analysis
indicates. We are keenly aware that it is much easier to start new government
programs than to end them. The relative merits of government spending and of
dierent tax policies as a way of dealing with the zero-bound problem remain very
much an open issue in the presence of political economy considerations. What our
analysis does indicate is that measures designed to increase aggregate demand are
52particularly powerful during episodes in which the zero bound binds.
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Governmentïspending multiplier, labor income tax increases from 0 to 1% and R=0 for 12 periods
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